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INTRODUCTION 
Drafting contracts-by which I really mean the documents that embody 
contracts-requires investments of time, experience, and ingenuity. Those 
investments may yield significant returns because the quality of contractual 
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terms can be an important determinant of the gains that parties realize from 
trade.1 This in tum suggests that, from an economic perspective, it is impor­
tant to understand how contracts are produced. It seems particularly 
important to examine the production of contracts or individual contractual 
terms that are widely used-that is to say, "boilerplate."2 In a market­
oriented society, boilerplate is the predominant feature of the network of 
legal obligations that provides the formal structure of economic activity. As 
a result, depending on the extent to which parties' behavior tracks their for­
mally defined obligations, the quality of boilerplate can be a crucial 
determinant of overall patterns of economic activity. Understanding the de­
terminants of the quality of boilerplate is an important step toward 
understanding whether and how the state ought to intervene in its produc­
tion. 
Recent academic literature on this topic has focused on production of 
boilerplate by either for-profit actors-whether for their own use or for use 
by their clients--or the state.
3 
The dominant theme is that for-profit actors 
typically have sub-optimal incentives to invest in production of contractual 
terms because they often cannot capture all of the benefits that flow from 
those investments. As for the state, the main concern is that it lacks the 
competence to formulate contracts that are suited to the diverse needs of 
private commercial actors. 
This Article takes a different tack and focuses on the role played by enti­
ties that are organized as nonprofits ("nonprofits")-a broad category that 
includes charitable organizations as well as distinctly non-charitable organi­
zations such as trade associations-in the production of boilerplate. The 
analysis here begins with and is motivated by the observation that, in the 
United States at least, nonprofits, and in particular trade associations, seem 
to play a substantial role in producing boilerplate. Specifically, many non-
I. One way in which the quality of a contract determines the value that parties derive from 
a transaction is by affecting the amount of uncertainty that surrounds the meaning of the parties' 
obligations. A good contract will also define the parties' obligations in the event of various contin­
gencies in ways that mitigate problems posed by asymmetric information. See generally Ronald J. 
Gilson, Value Creation by Business Lawyers: legal Skills and Asset Pricing, 94 YALE L.J. 239 
(1984) (demonstrating how the terms of a typical corporate acquisition agreement can increase the 
total value realized by the parties). 
2. For an illuminating discussion of the value of studying contractual documents, see Mark 
C. Suchman, The Contract as Social Anifact, 37 LAW & Soc'y REV. 91 (2003). For the history of 
standard form contracts, see P.S. ATIYAH, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF CONTRACT 16 (5th ed. 
1995), and G.H. TREITEL, THE LAW OF CONTRACT 196-261 ( 1995). For the history of the term 
"boilerplate," see Carol Bast, A Short History of Boilerplate, 5 SCRIBES J. LEGAL WRITING 155 
( 1994). 
3. See, e.g., Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, The Limits of Expanded Choice: An Analy­
sis of the Interactions Between Express and Implied Contract Terms, 73 CAL. L. REV. 261 ( 1985); 
Henry T. Greely, Contracts As Commodities: The Influence of Secondary Purr:hasers on the Form of 
Contracts, 42 VAND. L. REV. 133, 160--61 (1989); Marcel Kahan & Michael Klausner, Standardiza­
tion and Innovation in Corporate Contracting (Or "The Economics of Boilerplate"), 83 VA. L. REv. 
713 ( 1997); Michael Klausner, Corporations, Corporate Law, and Networks of Contracts, 81 VA. L. 
REV. 757 (1995); Suchman, supra note 2, at 102. 
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profits produce contractual terms that seem likely to be used with little or no 
modification by a significant number of other parties.
4 
The core argument here is that, as a theoretical matter, there are at least 
four reasons to believe that it makes a difference whether boilerplate is pro­
duced by a nonprofit as opposed to a for-profit. The first reason is that, 
because of their distinctive mandates, when making decisions nonprofits 
sometimes take into account benefits and costs that are not recognized by 
for-profit organizations. Second, some nonprofits are relatively well placed 
to stimulate demand for contracts by credibly assuring prospective users of 
their value. Third, some nonprofits can produce contracts of a given quality 
at a relatively low cost because they have superior ability to attract volunteer 
labor. Fourth, nonprofits can produce contracts at a relatively low cost be­
cause they enjoy preferential tax treatment.5 Understanding the reasons why 
nonprofits are so heavily involved in producing contracts constitutes an im­
portant step toward understanding whether this state of affairs is likely, from 
society's perspective, to be optimal. This understanding can in tum inform 
analyses of whether and when the state ought to play a role in the formula­
tion of contractual terms. It also sheds light on the question of whether state 
intervention in this area ought to involve encouraging or discouraging the 
production of boilerplate by nonprofits. Finally, this analysis provides a 
counterpoint to studies that focus on the socially harmful anti-competitive 
activities of nonprofit trade associations.
6 
Part I of this Article describes the significant roles that a range of non­
profits play in producing boilerplate in the United States. Part II discusses 
the reasons why production of boilerplate by nonprofits might be different 
from production of boilerplate by for-profits. Part III discusses whether it is 
desirable from society's perspective for nonprofits to play a substantial role 
in producing boilerplate. Part IV discusses the legal implications of the pre­
ceding Parts. A brief Conclusion follows. 
4. K.N. Llewellyn, The Effect of Legal Institutions Upon Economics, 15 AM. EcoN. REV. 
665, 672-74 (1925); Lisa Bernstein, Private Commercial Law, in 3 THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTION­
ARY OF EcONOMICS AND THE LAW 108 (Peter Newman ed., 1998); see also Goetz & Scott, supra 
note 3, at 293, 30�4; Kahan & Klausner, supra note 3, at 761-64; cf Greely, supra note 3, at 160-
61 (suggesting that few voluntary standard-setting organizations exist for contracts). 
5. The first of these arguments has been discussed in the literature on the production of 
contracts. See Robert B. Ahdieh, The Role of Groups in Norm Transformation: A Dramatic Sketch, 
in Three Parts, 6 CHI. J. lNT'L L. 231, 249-52 (2005) (discussing role of groups in solving collec­
tive action and coordination problems); Lisa Bernstein, supra note 4, at 110-11; Lisa Bernstein, 
Private Commercial Law in the Cotton Industry: Creating Cooperation Through Rules, Norms, And 
Institutions, 99 MICH. L. REv. 1724, 1742-43 (2001); Goetz & Scott, supra note 3, at 293, 303; 
Kahan & Klausner, supra note 3, at 762. The second point is briefly discussed in Ahdieh, supra, at 
258. The third and fourth arguments do not appear to have received attention. Analogues to all of 
these arguments have been presented in the literature concerning the production of goods other than 
boilerplate. See generally HENRY HANSMANN, THE OWNERSHIP OF ENTERPRISE 227-45 (1996); 
Josh Lerner & Jean Tirole, Some Simple Economics of Open Source, 50 J. lNDUS. EcoN. 197 (2002). 
6. See, for example, ALFRED D. CHANDLER JR., THE VISIBLE HAND: THE MANAGERIAL 
REVOLUTION IN AMERICAN BUSINESS 316-17 (1977), which describes the emergence of trade asso­
ciations "for the purpose of controlling price and production" in the United States in the 1870s and 
1880s. 
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I. NONPROFITS THAT PRODUCE BOILERPLATE 
There are a number of different types of sources of boilerplate. Some­
times terms that eventually become boilerplate originate in contracts that are 
drafted by parties for their own use with little or no assistance from anyone 
else. On other occasions terms are drafted by for-profit actors-typically 
legal professionals-for use by other parties. These terms become boiler­
plate either because they are widely copied or because they are used 
repeatedly by the drafter or its client. Still other examples of boilerplate are 
drafted from the outset for widespread use and are marketed by for-profit 
firms as "forms" or "model contracts." In the past these contracts were dis­
tributed in paper form. Now, however, many firms distribute their products 
in electronic form, and often over the Internet.7 Some of the more sophisti­
cated suppliers allow parties to assemble their own contracts electronically 
either by picking from a range of standard terms or by responding to queries 
about their preferences.
8 
Although a great deal remains to be written about the production of boi­
lerplate under these circumstances, the focus of this Article is on another 
situation: the production of boilerplate by nonprofits for use· by others. 
There is no obvious and readily available source of information on the num­
ber of occasions on which parties use contractual terms that have been 
drafted, in whole or in part, by nonprofits as opposed to other types of or­
ganizations. It is, however, possible to get a sense of the magnitude of 
nonprofits' role in the production of boilerplate in the United States by ex­
amining the range of nonprofit organizations engaged in producing 
contractual terms intended for widespread use. Most of those nonprofits are 
trade associations. However, bar associations and a few other types of or­
ganizations are also active in this field. 
A. Trade Associations 
In the United States there are several industries in which trade associa­
tions are heavily involved in producing contracts. For instance, many trade 
associations representing various professions involved in the construction 
industry produce contracts. The best known of these may be the American 
Institute of Architects ("AIA"), which has been distributing contracts since 
1 888. The AIA now offers over ninety distinct contracts and documents. The 
AIA contracts were originally distributed in paper form. However, like many 
other organizations, the AIA now also licenses its contracts in electronic 
form. In fact, the AIA contracts are embedded in a sophisticated customized 
software package that contains a number of potentially useful features. For 
7. See, e.g., Bloomberg, Software Support, http://about.bloomberg.com/software/index.html 
(last visited Aug. 6, 2005); LexisNexis Matthew Bender, http://bender.lexisnexis.com/ bender/ 
us/catalog?action=home (last visited Aug. 6, 2005); LexisONE, http://www.lexisone.com (last vis­
ited Aug. 6, 2005); Westlaw, http://west.thomson.com/store/default.asp (last visited Aug. 6, 2005). 
8. See, for example, the products offered by Invisible Hand Software LLC d/b/a Quickform 
Contracts, http://www.quickforms.net (last visited Aug. 6, 2005). 
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instance, the software allows information pertaining to a particular project to 
be inputted only once and then automatically entered where necessary on all 
of the contracts associated with a given project. The software also permits 
users to modify the standard terms but still view a record of the deleted ma­
terial. Users can choose between licenses that allow them to print fixed or 
unlimited numbers of copies.9 
An interesting feature of the construction industry in the United States is 
that there are a number of trade associations offering forms that can serve as 
substitutes for one another. For instance, in addition to the architects, the 
Associated General Contractors of America ("AGC") offer a range of con­
tracts that is almost as extensive as that of the AJA. Many of the AGC 
contracts are close substitutes for the AJA contracts and AGC's customized 
software is similar in terms of the level of sophistication. '0 In fact, AGC ap­
pears to have begun drafting contracts in response to perceived 
shortcomings in the AJA contracts. Interestingly, by way of comparison, the 
trade associations involved in the construction industries in England and 
Canada have chosen to collaborate to produce a single set of forms." This 
kind of collaboration has occurred to a more limited extent in the United 
States under the auspices of the Engineers Joint Contracts Documents 
Committee ("EJCDC").12 
Besides the construction industry, another industry in which trade asso­
ciations appear to play a significant role in drafting contracts is real estate 
brokerage. In the United States, state and local associations of realtors draft 
various contracts for use in connection with the sale of real estate. Access to 
the contracts is typically provided to the associations' members as one of the 
benefits of membership. Many of the contracts are distributed electronically 
9. Links to software downloads and information about ordering AIA documents are avail­
able at AIA Contract Documents, http://www.aia.org/docs_default (last visited Aug. 2, 2005). 
10. The AGC has historically played an important role in the production of the AIA docu­
ments. The AIA has traditionally sought the endorsement of its A-Series (construction) documents 
from several other construction trade associations. Since 1966, however, the AIA has sought only 
the endorsement of the AGC. Justin Sweet, The Architectural Profession Responds to Construction 
Management and Design-Build: The Spotlight on AJA Documents, LAW & CoNTEMP. PRoBs., Win­
ter 1983, at 69, 76. 
11. In the UK, the Joint Contracts Tribunal ("JCT') comprises the Association of Consulting 
Engineers, British Property Federation, Construction Confederation, Local Government Association, 
National Specialist Contractors Council, Royal Institute of British Architects, The Royal Institution 
of Chartered Surveyors, and the Scottish Building Contract Committee. This organization was estab­
lished in 1931 and produces standard form contracts and other documents for the construction 
industry. 
The Canadian Construction Documents Committee ("CCDC") was formed in 1974 and com­
prises the Association of Consulting Engineers of Canada, Canadian Construction Association, 
Construction Specifications Canada, and the Royal Architectural Institute of Canada. The CCDC 
produces more than twenty standard contracts and other documents used in both the private and 
public sector; approximately fifty thousand copies of these documents are sold annually. 
12. EJCDC is a joint venture of the AGC, the National Society of Professional Engi­
neers/Professional Engineers in Private Practice ("NSPE/PEPP''), the American Council of 
Engineering Companies ("ACEC"), and the American Society of Civil Engineers-Construction 
Institute ("ASCE-CI"). Links to EJCDC documents are available at About Engineers Joint Contract 
Documents Committee, http://www.agc.org/page.ww?section=EJCDC&name=About+Engineers+ 
Joint+Contract+Documents+Committee (last visited Aug. 2, 2005). 
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through a software package marketed by a for-profit entity that is a joint 
venture of the National Association of Realtors and the California Associa­
tion of Realtors.13 
There are other U.S. industries in which trade associations play a promi­
nent role in drafting contracts. For example, trade associations focusing on 
14 • & 15 natural products such as cotton, gram and 1eed, and natural gas and elec-
tricity16 draft either model contracts or terms designed to be incorporated by 
reference into other contracts. Another example is the entertainment indus­
try, where associations such as the Director's Guild of America ("DGA"), 
the American Federation of TV & Radio Artists ("AFfRA"), and the 
Writer's Guild of America ("W GA'') are active in drafting model contracts.17 
Yet another example is the oil and gas industry, where the American Asso­
ciation of Petroleum Landmen and the American Petroleum Institute draft a 
number of model contracts. 18 Most associations make their contracts avail­
able in electronic form, but the degree of sophistication with which they do 
• 19 
so vanes. 
There are also a number of international trade associations involved in 
producing contracts. Perhaps the most prominent example is the Interna­
tional Chamber of Commerce ("ICC"). In this context the ICC is probably 
best known for two products: the Uniform Customs and Practice for Docu­
mentary Credits ("UCP") and Incoterms (short for International Commercial 
Terms). These products are not free-standing contracts but qualify as boiler-
13. ZipForm, http://www.zipfonn.com/company/background.asp (last visited Aug. 2, 2005) 
(describing background of the joint venture company). 
14. The American Cotton Shippers Association and the National Council of Textile Organi­
zations jointly produce the Southern Mill Rules which govern transactions between cotton growers 
and mills. The rules can be found by following these links, About ACSA: Rules and Policies: South­
ern Mill Rules, http://www.acsa-cotton.org (last visited Aug. 2, 2005). See generally Bernstein, 
supra note 5, at 1726. 
15. Nat'! Grain & Feed Ass'n, http://www.ngfa.org (last visited Aug. 2, 2005). See generally 
Lisa Bernstein, The Questionable Empirical Basis of Anicle 2 's Incorporation Strategy: A Prelimi­
nary Study, 66 U. CHI. L. REY. 7 IO, 725-30 (I 999). Bernstein also discusses trade associations that 
have drafted model contracts for use in the hay and silk industries. Moving to a different part of the 
agricultural sector, Cheung mentions in passing a standard contract for beekeepers that was drafted 
by a trade association. See Steven N.S. Cheung, The Fable of the Bees: An Economic Investigation, 
16 J.L. & EcoN. 11, 29 (1973). For examples of sample contracts for beekeepers, see the University 
of Georgia's Honey Bee Program, http://www.ent.uga.edu/bees/Pollination/Pollination.htm (last 
visited Aug. 2, 2005), and Kim Aottum, Proper Pollination, Using a Written Contract ls Good 
Business, BEE CULTURE, 218-19 (April 1996). 
16. North American Energy Standards Board, Business Standards and Code Repository, 
http://www.gisb.org/materials/bscr.asp (last visited Jan. 9, 2006). 
17. Standard form contracts produced by several entertainment industry unions (including 
the DGA, AFTRA, and W GA) are available at Global Producer: An Informational Portal for 
the Entertainment Industry Worldwide, http://www.globalproducer.com/PAGES/Lib/CONTRACTS 
.htm#3 (last visited Aug. 2, 2005). 
18. For a global survey of model contracts in the oil and gas industry, see A. Timothy Martin, 
Model Contracts: A Survey of the Global Petroleum Industry, 22 J. ENERGY & NAT. RESOURCES L. 
281 (2004). 
19. An example of an organization that offers printed standard contracts rather than online 
documents is the Rocky Mountain Mineral Law Institute. 
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plate because they consist of terms designed to be incorporated into other 
contracts. The ICC has traditionally also offered a handful of model con­
tracts for use in connection with international transactions. Recently, it 
began to offer a service that allows users to draft international sales con­
tracts online. The system prompts the user to enter various categories of 
information-for example, price, payment method, description of goods, 
governing law, etc.-and then produces a contract based on language 
drafted by the ICC. The contract can even be stored online and signed digi­
tally by the counterparty. 
Other international associations that draft contracts include: the Associa­
tion of International Petroleum Negotiators (oil and gas);20 BIMCO 
(international shipping);21 the Federation of Oils, Seeds and Fats Associa­
tions (oilseeds, oils and fats, and groundnuts);22 the Grain and Feed Trade 
Association (grain and feed);23 the International Swaps and Derivatives As­
sociation (over-the-counter derivatives);24 and Lloyd's of London (salvage).2
5 
Trade associations seem to rely heavily on volunteers in drafting con­
tracts. Typically they enlist senior members of the industry to serve on 
drafting committees and then solicit comments on drafts from a broader 
spectrum of members.26 Volunteers are typically assisted by one or two paid 
staff members and, in some cases, outside counsel. It is also worth noting 
that, in a sense, many trade associations rely on other trade associations for 
assistance in drafting contracts-as evidenced by cases in which one asso­
ciation consults another association about, and eventually receives an 
endorsement of, a particular contract. For example, in the construction in­
dustry it is quite common for a number of specialized trade associations to 
endorse general purpose contracts prepared by organizations such as the 
AGC or the AIA.27 
20. Ass'n of Int'l Petroleum Negotiators, Visitors Area Model Contracts, http://www.aipn.org/ 
modelagreements (last visited Aug. 2, 2005) (listing documents for sale). 
21. BIMCO, http://www.bimco.dk (last visited Aug. 2, 2005). 
22. Fed. of Oils, Seeds & Fats Ass'ns, http://www.fosfa.org (last visited Aug. 2, 2005). 
23. Grain & Feed Trade Ass'n, http://www.gafta.com (last visited Aug. 2, 2005). 
24. Int'! Swaps & Derivatives Ass'n, http://www.isda.org (last visited Aug. 2, 2005); see also 
Stephen J. Choi & G. Mitu Gulati, Contract as Statute, 104 MICH. L. REv. 1129, 1139-40 (2006). 
25. The 2000 Lloyd's Open Form ("LOF') can be downloaded at Lloyd's Agency System, 
https://www.lloydsagency.com/ Agency/ Agency.nsf/vw AJl/856731F0768244CB80256B8F0034E2B 
D/$file/Iof%202000.pdf (last visited Aug. 14, 2005). An alternative standard salvage contract was 
created by BoatU.S. and is available at http://www.boatus.com/towing/guide/salvage/contract.asp 
(last visited Aug. 15, 2005). 
26. See Bernstein, supra note 15, at 718 ("In most associations, trade rules are drafted and 
subsequently amended by committees of experienced industry members who serve without compen­
sation . . . .  "). 
27. See, e.g., Minn. Mech. Contractors Ass'n, http://www.mn-mca.org/index.html (last vis­
ited Aug. 2, 2005). 
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B. Bar Associations 
The American Bar Association produces a range of model contracts 
jointly with the American Law Institute. According to the joint venture's 
website, the best-selling contracts include various types of real estate leases 
and an asset purchase agreement.28 Unlike many of the trade associations 
discussed above, the ABA does not seem to have any institutional structures 
in place to update its contracts. Rather, the contracts seem to be produced on 
an ad hoc basis on the initiative of specific committees within the organiza­
tion. 
C. Other Nonprofits 
There are a few miscellaneous types of nonprofits besides trade associa­
tions and bar associations that produce contracts.29 The Rocky Mountain 
Mineral Law Foundation is an example of a quasi-academic nonprofit that 
sells a handful of model contracts for use in the mining and oil and gas in­
dustries. 30 An intriguing recent development has been the emergence of 
nonprofits dedicated to drafting and disseminating contracts whose terms 
reflect commitments to values other than creating purely economic benefits 
for users. Prominent examples of these sorts of organizations are Creative 
Commons and the Free Software Foundation. These and other organizations 
freely distribute copyright licenses that are, in their view, consistent with the 
goal of providing greater access to copyrighted materials than default legal 
rules would otherwise allow.31 In addition to providing its own copyright 
licenses, the Free Software Foundation maintains a webpage analyzing the 
extent to which various other license agreements are consistent with its 
28. ALI-ABA Direct-to-Desktop CLE, Our Best-Selling Forms, https://d2d.ali-aba.org (fol­
low "View All Forms" hyperlink) (last visited Aug. 2, 2005) (listing online courses, articles, and 
forms). 
29. The American Law Institute and the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform 
State Law have somewhat arbitrarily been excluded from the following discussion. These organiza­
tions draft the Uniform Commercial Code which, to the extent that it contains default rules that 
parties are free to exclude, are functionally equivalent to boilerplate drafted by trade associations. 
However, the fact that some of the rules drafted by these and similar organizations are mandatory 
rules (or at least "sticky" defaults) that are ultimately enacted as statutes seems to make their activi­
ties qualitatively different from those of the other entities discussed in this Article (although the 
distinction becomes blurred in cases in which boilerplate comes to be treated as binding custom). 
Moreover, the drafting activities of these entities have been analyzed in some depth by other com­
mentators. See generally George G. Triantis, Private Lawmaking and the Uniform Commercial 
Code, in 3 NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF EcoNOMICS AND THE LAW 117 (Peter Newman ed., 
1998). 
30. Rocky Mountain Mineral Law Found., http://www.nnmlf.org (last visited Aug. 2, 2005). 
31. See, e.g., Creative Commons, About Us, http://creativecommons.org/about/history (last 
visited Aug. 2, 2005) ("Thus, a single goal unites Creative Commons' current and future projects: to 
build a layer of reasonable, flexible copyright in the face of increasingly restrictive default rules."); 
The GNU Project, Licenses, http://www.gnu.org/licenses/licenses.html#Intro (last visited Aug. 2, 
2005) ("Published software should be free software."). 
March 2006] The Role of Nonprofits 1083 
commitment to "free software."32 Similarly, the Open Source Initiative ana­
lyzes licenses for consistency with its definition of "open source."33 It is not 
always clear what procedures these nonprofits follow when drafting or re-
• • 34 v1ewmg contracts. 
Finally, although they do not draft contracts themselves, it is also worth 
mentioning nonprofits that assist potential users by making contracts drafted 
by others readily accessible. At least one nonprofit research institution, Con­
tracting and Organizations Research Institute ("CORI"), has begun to make 
contracts collected from sources such as filings with the U.S. Securities and 
Exchange Commission available online without charge.3
5 
II. DIFFERENCES BETWE E N  PRODUCTION OF BOILERPLAT E 
BY NONPROFITS AND FOR-PROFITS 
There are a number of reasons why it might make a difference whether 
boilerplate is produced by nonprofits such as trade associations as opposed 
to for-profits such as private law firms or established providers of legal in­
formation such as LexisNexis or Westlaw. In the first place, nonprofits and 
for-profits may have different objectives when drafting contracts and so may 
make different decisions on matters such as how much to invest in drafting 
or updating contracts, whether to adopt biased terms, and what price to 
charge for the contracts they draft. A second consideration is that the con­
tracts drafted by nonprofits and for-profits may not be equally attractive to 
potential users. One reason for this is that nonprofits may generally be per­
ceived to be more credible. Alternatively, nonprofits may be perceived to 
have a higher profile than other producers of boilerplate and so the contracts 
that they draft will be expected to attract larger numbers of other users, 
which may in tum make them relatively attractive to each individual user. A 
third factor is that nonprofits may have lower costs of production because 
they have superior access to volunteers. Fourth, nonprofits enjoy preferential 
tax treatment, which may also tend to lower their costs of producing boiler­
plate. 
It bears emphasizing that these four factors represent potential differ­
ences between nonprofits and for-profits; in practice the differences might 
32. See Free Software Foundation, Licenses, http://www.fsf.org/licensing/licenses/ 
index_html (last visited Aug. 2, 2005). 
33. See Open Source Initiative, OSI Certification Mark and Program: Getting a License 
Approved, http://www.opensource.org/docs/certification_mark.php#approval (last visited Aug. 2, 
2005). 
34. One commentator has complained, "[W)hile open source developers pride themselves in 
the number of eyeballs devoted to fixing buggy software, buggy open source licenses suffer from 
inattention. To make matters worse, the authors of the most important open source licenses do not 
regularly evaluate the licenses and fix them when they are broken." Robert W. Gomulkiewicz, De­
bugging Open Source Software Licensing, 64 U. PITT. L. REV. 75, 95 (2002). Gomulkiewicz rec­
ommends that open source software licenses be drafted by an entity that would periodically consult 
a wide range of interested parties. This entity would presumably be a nonprofit. See id. at 100. 
35. See Contracting and Orgs. Research Inst., http://cori.missouri.edu (last visited Aug. 2, 
2005) (providing a free database that includes access to over forty thousand contracts). 
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not be significant. As a result it will not necessarily be the case that the po­
tential differences between nonprofits and for-profits translate into 
significant differences between the contracts produced by nonprofits and 
for-profits. There are also many different types of nonprofits and so there 
may be significant differences between the contracts produced by different 
types of nonprofits. Finally, it is also worth keeping in mind the fact that 
there are differences among for-profits and some for-profits resemble non­
profits along the dimensions that are most relevant for present purposes. 
Most of the claims made below in relation to nonprofits should apply to any 
entity that is not absolutely committed to maximization of financial profits. 
Other entities that might fit this description include customer-owned coop­
eratives and for-profit corporations controlled by altruistic shareholders. 
A. Objectives 
Nonprofits and for-profits might perceive the benefits and costs of pro­
ducing boilerplate for use by others differently. In particular, while for­
profits might only take into account the net financial returns that they realize 
from producing contracts, nonprofits might take into account a broader 
range of factors when making decisions, factors that a for-profit would re­
gard as "externalities."36 It is useful to begin by outlining those factors. 
1. Externalities Associated with Drafting Contracts 
There are a number of factors that a third party drafting a contract for 
use by others could take into account besides its own (net) financial returns. 
For one, it might take into account the net benefits that accrue to the cus­
tomers to whom it sells boilerplate terms. So, for instance, depending upon 
how much it cares about the welfare of its customers, a drafter with market 
power may or may not exploit that power by raising the price of contracts 
that it sells. Similarly, the drafter may or may not take into account the ex­
tent to which adopting standardized contractual terms will facilitate (or 
impede) anti-competitive pricing.37 A drafter's attitude toward its customers 
36. The pecuniary benefits need not be limited to amounts received directly from users of 
contracts. The mere fact that it is difficult to charge users directly for the benefits associated with a 
good or service does not necessarily mean that a for-profit firm has no incentive to produce that 
good or service. Goods and services such as the news, television or radio programming, and Internet 
search engines are all produced by for-profit firms in the face of these constraints. This is typically 
possible because by distributing these goods from a particular location (virtual or physical) the firm 
creates a potential audience, access to which it then sells to advertisers. There is no reason why 
firms producing contracts cannot adopt a similar strategy. In fact, some relatively simple contracts 
are distributed by for-profit firms on this basis. See, e.g., Internet Legal Research Group, 
http://www.ilrg.com (last visited Aug. 4, 2005). In other cases products are distributed below cost in 
order to demonstrate their quality and thereby promote the long-run business interests of their pro­
ducer. Cf Cheung, supra note 15, at 29-32 (providing account of how difficulties of contracting 
with potential beneficiaries of services were overcome by beekeepers). 
37. On the one hand, standardization makes it relatively easy for the members of a cartel to 
detect defection from agreed prices. On the other hand, standardization makes it easy for consumers 
to shop around. Compare Douglas G. Baird, The Boilerplate Puzzle, 104 MICH. L. REv. 933, 941 
(2006), and Lewis Kornhauser, Unconscionability in Standard Forms 64 CAL. L. REV. 1151, 1177-
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will also determine whether it chooses to make unobservable investments in 
drafting boilerplate or in updating it to reflect new developments. In many 
situations the profit-maximizing course of action will be to avoid truly un­
observable investments in drafting and updating simply because customers 
will be unwilling to trust the drafter enough to pay for benefits that they 
cannot see.38 
Leaving aside customers, a drafter also could take into account the bene­
fits or costs its decisions create for users who are not customers and so will 
not provide compensation to, or demand compensation from, the drafter. 
These costs and benefits can take several forms. To begin with, if, as is often 
the case, the drafter deals with only one of the parties to the contract in 
which the terms are ultimately embodied, the customer may pay the drafter 
to adopt terms that are biased against other parties in ways that are difficult 
to observe. One way or another, this approach to drafting will impose costs 
on the victims of the bias. 
A drafter might also take into account the costs and benefits its actions 
generate for third parties who gain access to copies of the contract indi­
rectly.39 This phenomenon-whose prevalence will depend in part upon 
technological factors40-is potentially significant because the third parties 
might benefit considerably from obtaining access to the fruits of a drafter's 
efforts. Referring to an existing contract can help actors identify contingen­
cies that are likely to arise in the course of particular types of transactions 
and that ought to be taken into account when planning them. Starting with 
an existing contract at hand can also, naturally, simplify the task of finding 
words to express intentions about how various contingencies are to be ad­
dressed.41 
78 (1976), with David Gilo & Ariel Porat, The Hidden Roles of Boilerplate and Standard-Form 
Contracts, 104 MICH. L. REV. 983, 1004-08 (2006) (discussing effects of complexity of contracts) 
(from a consumer's perspective, absence of standardization seems likely to increase complexity). 
38. For a formal model that captures this idea see Edward L. Glaeser & Andrei Shleifer, Not­
/or-Profit Entrepreneurs, 81 J. PUB. EcoN. 99 (2001). 
39. Kahan & Klausner's empirical analysis of revisions to contracts used in the issuance of 
corporate bonds suggests that copying in this context is widespread. See Kahan & Klausner, supra 
note 3, at 745, 747. But those contracts are, as both a matter of law and of practical necessity, widely 
distributed and so obtaining access to them is particularly easy. 
40. The state of technology can influence the ease of both copying and restricting access to 
contracts. On the one hand, the ability to digitize and then distribute perfect reproductions of con­
tracts to large numbers of users at virtually no marginal cost (for example, by posting it on the 
Internet) has drastically increased the number of unauthorized copies that are likely to be made of a 
contract once any unauthorized copying occurs. On the other hand, digitization has also made it 
easier to limit initial access to contracts by distributing them individually rather than as parts of a 
package. In the past, the economies of scale associated with distributing contracts in printed form 
me�nt that it was cheaper to distribute several contracts as a package than to distribute them sepa­
rately-hence, the formbook. Now, however, it is economically feasible to distribute contracts 
individually in electronic form. 
41. Kahan & Klausner, supra note 3, at 720-21; see also Claire A. Hill, Why Contracts Are 
Written in "Legalese", 77 Ctt1.-KENT L. REV. 59, 67 (2001). Copyright law clearly influences the 
extent to which third parties can benefit from existing contracts in this way. Interestingly, in U.S. 
cases involving contracts the copyright statute has been interpreted so that assertion of copyright is 
only likely to prevent the most blatant forms of copying. See generally Goetz & Scott, supra note 3, 
at 292 n.78; Paul G. Reiter, Annotation, Copyright, Under Federal Copyright Laws, of Forms, or 
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A drafter could also take into account the effects of its decisions on third 
parties who will not necessarily have access to copies of the terms that it 
drafts, but who either already use or will use terms that serve similar pur­
poses.42 It is generally the case that each occasion on which a particular 
contractual term is used increases the likelihood of a dispute over its inter­
pretation being litigated. This implies that each time a person uses a 
particular contractual term it benefits other users of the same term by in­
creasing the rate at which judicial precedents interpreting and, hopefully, 
clarifying the meaning of that term can be expected to accumulate.4
3 In a 
similar vein, each time a person uses a particular contractual term it creates 
a benefit for other users of that term by increasing the incentive for actors 
such as potential counterparties, lawyers, and financiers to invest in becom­
ing familiar with the term. The more familiar a term is to these sorts of 
actors, the more valuable it is likely to be to a user.44 Both these points sug­
gest that by producing terms that are or will become boilerplate a drafter can 
create benefits for other users of those terms. 
The corollary though is that by selecting a particular term the drafter 
may impose costs on users of alternative terms. This is because the more 
widely used is a particular contractual term the less rapidly judicial prece­
dents will accumulate around alternative terms. In addition, the more 
popular a given term becomes, the weaker the incentive for potential coun­
terparties and other actors to familiarize themselves with alternative terms. 
Both these factors suggest that by producing boilerplate a drafter can reduce 
the value of alternative terms to third parties. If those third parties find it 
costly to switch to the new terms, for instance because it is costly to read 
Form Books, 8 A.L.R. FED. 869 (1971). The federal copyright statute does protect contracts as 
"original works of authorship." 17 U.S.C. § I02(a) (2000). However, in cases involving contracts the 
courts have insisted upon more than a minimal amount of originality. See Donald v. Uarco Bus. 
Forms, 478 F.2d 764 (8th Cir. 1973); M.M. Bus. Forms Corp. v. Uarco, Inc., 472 F.2d 1137 (6th Cir. 
1973); Donald v. Zack Meyer's T.V. Sales and Serv., 426 F.2d 1027 (5th Cir. 1970); Dorsey v. Old 
Sur. Life Ins. Co., 98 F.2d 872 (10th Cir. 1938). It has also been held that the specific language of a 
contract or a business form cannot be copyrighted where the use of that language is essential to 
expressing a particular underlying idea. Cont'! Cas. Co. v. Beardsley, 253 F.2d 702, 706 (2d Cir. 
1958). Finally, even if specific language is copyrighted, that copyright is not infringed by using 
similar language embodying the same idea, much less by different language. Dorsey, 98 F.2d 872 
(10th Cir. 1938); see also Aldrich v. Remington Rand, Inc., 52 F. Supp. 732 (N.D. Tex. 1942) (tax 
bookkeeping system); Crume v. Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 55 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 267 (N.D. Ill. 1942) 
(reorganization of insurance company), aff'd, 140 F.2d 182 (7th Cir. 1944); Long v. Jordan, 29 F. 
Supp. 287 (N.D. Cal. 1939) (pension system). But see Baldwin Cooke Co. v. Keith Clark, Inc., 383 
F. Supp. 650 (N.D. Ill. 1974) (distinguishing Dorsey on the basis of the sophistication and complex­
ity of format and arrangement of the product involved); Smith v. Thompson, 43 F. Supp. 848, 850 
(S.D. Cal. 1941) (distinguishing Dorsey because of evidence that the defendant was a former em­
ployee of plaintiff and upon leaving such employ immediately set himself up in business and copied 
in minute details the plaintiff's method of doing business). 
42. The "network externalities" discussed in this paragraph are discussed in more detail in 
Klausner, supra note 3. 
43. See Kahan & Klausner, supra note 3, at 722-23; Klausner, supra note 3, at 775-79. 
44. See Greely, supra note 3, at 136-37; Kahan & Klausner, supra note 3, at 723-24; Klaus­
ner, supra note 3, at 782-86. 
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them and analyze their import, then introducing the boilerplate may serve to 
make them worse off than before.45 
Of course, the magnitude of the externalities associated with drafting a 
contract will vary according to the circumstances. For instance, if an organi­
zation has a large share of the market for a given contract then the costs 
imposed on customers as a result of pricing above cost might be substantial. 
On the other hand, under these circumstances other externalities might be 
quite small. The larger is a drafter's share of the market for a given contract, 
the fewer third parties there will be. This argument holds whether the drafter 
is one of the principal parties to the contract or an agent such as a law firm.46 
This factor suggests that if we leave aside the externalities associated with 
pricing above cost, other externalities are likely to be least significant in 
industries characterized by high levels of industrial concentration among 
drafters.47 Correlatively, these externalities are likely to be most significant 
in industries characterized by "atomistic" contracting where no single 
drafter captures a large share of the social benefits of their efforts. 
2. Nonprofits' Responses to Externalities 
Are nonprofits more sensitive than for-profits to the externalities associ­
ated with drafting contracts? The answer depends on what we are willing to 
assume about how nonprofits as opposed to for-profits make decisions. The 
most straightforward way of approaching this issue is to assume that for­
profits always strive to maximize financial returns while nonprofits always 
faithfully pursue formally stated missions that do not involve maximizing 
financial returns.48 The assumption that for-profits single-mindedly strive to 
maximize profits implies that they ignore externalities when deciding 
whether and how to produce boilerplate and will only take into account 
benefits that can be translated into financial returns. 
By contrast, if we assume that organizations are generally loyal to their 
missions then nonprofits in general, and trade associations in particular, are 
likely to respond differently to the presence of at least certain types of 
45. Empirical studies of corporate and sovereign bond contracts suggest that switching costs 
in these contexts are high, as evidenced by individual actors' reluctance to adopt novel contracts. See 
Stephen J. Choi & G. Mitu Gulati, Innovation in Boilerplate Contracts: An Empirical Examination 
of Sovereign Bonds, 53 EMORY L.J. 929, 982-89 (2004); Kahan & Klausner, supra note 3, at 751-
53. For a discussion of the magnitude and importance of switching costs with an emphasis on costs 
incurred by assignees of contracts, see Greely, supra note 3, at 136--62. Choi and Gulati observe that 
the magnitude of switching costs will depend in part on the importance of speed in preparing the 
contract. See Choi & Gulati, supra, at 988 (discussing concern for speed in production of documents 
used in connection with issuances of sovereign bonds). The introduction of technology that makes it 
possible to compare documents and highlight differences between them electronically at the touch 
of a button has almost certainly reduced the costs of switching between closely related contracts. 
46. Choi & Gulati, supra note 45, at 994; Goetz & Scott, supra note 3, at 304; Kahan & 
Klausner, supra note 3, at 737-39. 
47. This is consistent with Greely's analysis. See Greely, supra note 3, at 158 (suggesting 
that in the industries he examined, barriers to standardization of contracts were overcome by the 
efforts of participants with large market shares). 
48. This assumption will be relaxed below. 
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potential externalities. One reason for this is that trade associations may find 
it relatively easy to translate benefits and costs that accrue to their members 
into financial returns because they may be able to recover the net benefits 
that accrue to their members by imposing some sort of Jevy.49 This technique 
is unlikely to be available to a for-profit firm. A second factor is that the 
missions of trade associations are, typically, to serve the interests of their 
members, their industries, or both.so 
Of course, on this view, the extent to which a nonprofit takes external­
ities into account will depend a great deal upon the nature of its mission, 
which is likely to depend in turn upon the composition of its membership. 
For instance, if the membership of a trade association comprises a large and 
representative portion of the potential users of a particular type of contract, 
then faithful pursuit of the association's mission is likely to be roughly 
equivalent to maximization of all of those users' net benefits.s 1 Such an as­
sociation might sell boilerplate at or below its cost of production, even if it 
could maximize its financial returns by setting a higher price.s2 It may also 
strive to produce boilerplate that is of high quality, unbiased, widely dis­
seminated, and either similar to terms used by other actors or unlikely to 
cause those actors to incur undue switching cost.s3 
But of course, not all trade associations have large or representative 
memberships. If the members of an association comprise only a small por­
tion of the potential users of a contract then they will not have an incentive 
to make large investments whose benefits redound principally to non­
members. Similar issues arise where the membership of a trade association 
is unrepresentative in the sense that the interests of its members systemati-
49. Ronald Coase makes similar arguments about the advantages of having lighthouse ser­
vices in England and Wales funded by a levy upon ship owners and delivered by a charitable 
corporation called Trinity House. See Ronald H. Coase, The Lighthouse in Economics, 1 7  J.L. & 
ECON. 357, 372-74 ( 1974). 
50. See, e.g., ALIGNING THE INST. FOR THE MILLENNIUM TASK FORCE, THE AJA REPORT: A 
STRATEGIC LONG-RANGE PLAN FOR THE AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF ARCHITECTS 7 ( 1 999) ('The 
American Institute of Architects is the voice of the architecture profession dedicated to: [s]erving its 
members[,] [a]dvancing their value[, and] [i]mproving the quality of the built environment."); Asso­
CIATED GEN. CONTRACTORS OF AM., STRATEGIC PLAN: 2004-2006, at 3 (2004), available at 
http://www.agc.org/galleries/default-file/StratPlan-Op.pdf. 
The Associated General Contractors of America, the voice of the construction industry, is an 
organization of qualified construction contractors and industry related companies de�icated to 
skill, integrity and responsibility. Operating in partnership with its Chapters, the Association 
provides a full range of services satisfying the needs and concerns of its members, thereby im­
proving the quality of construction and protecting the public interest. 
ASSOCIATED GEN. CONTRACTORS OF AM., supra. 
5 1 .  Goetz & Scott, supra note 3, at 303 ("Trade organizations provide a mechanism to inter­
nalize at least some of the gains from contractual innovation. If an organization representing a 
significant subset of the formulation's potential users develops a term, it can supply the coordination 
necessary to overcome the free-rider problems discussed earlier."). 
52. This argument is consistent with Henry Hansmann's more general argument that firms 
owned by customers might arise where the firm enjoys market power. See HANSMANN, supra note 5, 
at 24-25, 1 50,  1 58, 1 69. 
53. Bernstein, supra note 5, at 1 742-43 (explaining why trade associations in the cotton 
industry are likely to produce high quality terms). 
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cally diverge from the interests of other users of a contract that it produces. 
For example, the views of the members of an association of manufacturers 
of consumer goods may well diverge from those of the other parties (that is, 
consumers or suppliers) to the contracts that it drafts.
54 Similarly, in the con­
struction industry, an association exclusively representing architects may 
have interests that diverge from those of other potential parties to construc­
tion agreements. In these situations the association has an incentive to 
include unobservable but biased terms in the contracts it drafts. A trade as­
sociation that is insensitive to the interests of consumers also has an 
incentive to invest in drafting contracts that facilitate anti-competitive be­
havior. 
Trying to predict how nonprofits and for-profits will respond to external­
ities becomes even more complicated if we change our behavioral 
assumptions and take into account the fact that neither for-profit nor non­
profit organizations will necessarily be faithful to their formally defined 
roles. So for example, staff attorneys who wish to ensure that they retain 
their jobs might revise contracts frequently and ignore the switching costs 
entailed for the organization's members. They might also take the easy route 
through their days by undertaking purely cosmetic revisions rather than 
making substantial efforts to develop new terms. Similarly, there may be 
volunteers who join contract drafting committees solely for the sake of rais­
ing their professional profile and contribute little to the process once 
appointed. 
Some might argue that these sorts of agency costs are particularly sig­
nificant in the nonprofit world because nonprofits have no residual financial 
claimants. Residual financial claimants such as the shareholders in a for­
profit corporation have a strong incentive to hold agents of the organization 
accountable. This suggests that in nonprofits, agents, including the agents 
who draft contracts, may have a great deal of latitude to pursue objectives 
that are inconsistent with the overall missions of their organizations.55 On 
the other hand factors such as the fear of competition (from either for-profits 
or nonprofits), professional pride or the need to attract continued financial 
support from members or donors might override the effects of the absence 
of accountability to residual financial claimants. Other possibilities are that 
nonprofits will attempt to maximize profits from the sale of contracts be­
cause their senior managers personally benefit from higher profits or 
because they use the profits to subsidize other activities. This last set of fac­
tors would cause nonprofits to respond to externalities in exactly the same 
way as for-profits. 
54. The divergence of interest here may be more apparent than real since there are a variety 
of reasons why firms may find it advantageous to take the interests of their customers or suppliers 
into account when drafting contracts. See generally Clayton P. Gillette, Rolling Contracts as an 
Agency Problem, Wis. L. REv. 679, 690-7 1 2  (2004). 
55. This is not to deny that for-profit firms can be affected by agency costs. See generally 
Greely, supra note 3, at 1 65-66 (discussing how agency costs within for-profit firms or between 
those firms and their lawyers might affect drafting decisions). 
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B. Perceptions 
1 .  Ability to Offer Credible Assurances 
Regardless of whether nonprofits actually pursue different objectives 
than for-profits when drafting contracts for use by others, they may be per­
ceived to be dedicated to pursuing different objectives. This difference in 
perceptions may give nonprofits an advantage over for-profits in assuring 
prospective users of the value of whatever terms they actually draft. More 
specifically, nonprofits that are believed to pursue objectives other than sim­
ply maximizing the financial returns associated with drafting contracts 
might be better placed than for-profits to assure prospective users about the 
value of the terms they draft or endorse. 
The ability to assure prospective users of the value of contractual terms 
is important because it may be difficult for those prospective users to assess 
the value on their own. An independent assessment of the value of a contract 
would involve reading the contract, ascertaining its meaning-taking into 
account all relevant legal developments-and then considering whether the 
obligations it sets out are suitable for particular uses. All of these steps re­
quire costly investments of time and expertise. Moreover, the value of any 
given contract can change over time: changes in the law might alter its 
meaning, the circumstances in which it is being used might change so that 
new contingencies need to be addressed, or alternative contracts may be 
introduced that reduce the overall level of familiarity with the original con­
tract and the number of cases in which it is likely to be interpreted. 
Prospective users will want to minimize both the costs of assessing value 
and the risk of adopting a low-value contract. 
As we saw in the preceding section, for-profits do not necessarily have 
incentives to take unobservable actions that increase or maintain the value of 
the boilerplate that they produce. Specifically, prospective users of contrac­
tual terms drafted by a for-profit organization should be concerned that 
relatively little effort has been invested in drafting and updating the terms; 
that it contains terms that are subtly biased in favor of other parties; or that 
the for-profit will revise the contract frequently, forcing them either to incur 
the costs of switching to new terms or to bear the costs associated with us­
ing non-standard terms. It may be difficult for for-profits to assuage these 
concerns. 
By contrast, if prospective users believe that nonprofits have an incen­
tive to make unobservable investments in increasing and maintaining the 
value of contracts that they produce, then nonprofits ought to find it rela­
tively easy to provide credible assurances on all these points.56 So, for 
56. This argument is an application of Henry Hansmann's more general argument that firms 
owned by customers or without any owners at all have an advantage over other types of firms in 
mitigating problems of asymmetric information. See HANSMANN, supra note 5, at 27-29, 230-3 1 ,  
233-37 ( 1 996); Henry Hansmann, The Role of Nonprofit Enterprise, 8 9  YALE L.J. 835, 843--45 
( 1 980). The specific claim that the ability to pre-commit to drafting high-value contracts can induce 
other parties to economize on the costs of reading contracts is made in Eric Bennett Rasmusen, 
March 2006J The Role of Nonprofits 1 09 1  
instance, to the extent that a nonprofit i s  believed to have an independent 
incentive to produce high quality boilerplate, users may be willing to believe 
that unobservable investments in drafting and updating have been made. 
Similarly, concerns about subtly biased terms disappear to the extent that the 
terms in question have been drafted by an organization that is perceived to 
be uninterested in taking payoffs from interested parties and that has an in­
dependent incentive to draft unbiased terms. Finally, if terms are drafted by 
a nonprofit that is believed to be sensitive to the costs that its drafting deci­
sions impose upon third parties, then users may be confident that the 
contract will not be revised any more frequently than necessary. 
Of course, the practical significance of these potential differences be­
tween nonprofits and for-profits is unclear. First, for reasons identified 
above, prospective users may perceive nonprofits to be no more likely than 
for-profits to take their interests into account. Here it seems particularly sig­
nificant that many trade associations do not seem to be representative of the 
potential users of the contracts that they draft and therefore seem at least as 
likely as for-profits to inspire concerns about bias. On the other hand, many 
associations strive to address this potential concern by obtaining endorse­
ments from other trade associations or by participating in drafting 
coalitions.57 
The difference in credibility between nonprofits and for-profits may also 
be limited because for-profits might use techniques such as warranties and 
bonds to bolster their credibility. The first of these techniques, a warranty, 
essentially includes any binding offer to compensate users for harm caused 
by deficiencies in the contract. An offer of this sort is only effective, how­
ever, if it is possible for an adjudicator to verify the quality of the contract. 
Otherwise the promise of compensation will be unenforceable and the war­
ranty will be of no value to the user. My intuition is that, along most 
dimensions, the quality of contracts is difficult to verify.58 This may be one 




59 t elf pro ucts. 
Explaining Incomplete Contracts as the Result of Contract-Reading Costs, I ADVANCES IN EcoN. 
ANALYSIS & PoL'Y Issue I, Article 2 (2001)  at 9-1 0, 28. 
57. For a discussion of analogous practices among standard-setting organizations, see Josh 
Lerner & Jean Tirole, A Model of Forum-Shopping with Special Reference to Standard Setting Or­
ganizations, National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper No. 1 0664 (2004); Emmanuel 
Farhi ,  Josh Lerner & Jean Tirole, Certifying New Technologies, 3 J. EuR. EcoN. Ass. 734 (2005). 
58. This is  consistent with Gillian Hadfield's broader claim that the quality of all sorts of 
legal services is difficult to assess. See Gillian K. Hadfield, The Price of Law: How the Market for 
Lawyers Distorts the Justice System, 98 MICH. L. REV. 953 (2000). 
59. For instance, The Standard Legal Network, LLC sells legal form preparation software 
and standard form contracts with the following disclaimer: 
The documents and services offered for sale through any SLN web site and/or through other 
authorized distributors are sold with the understanding that SLN is not engaged in rendering 
legal advice. No document offered for sale, nor any other information contained on the web 
site or in the software, is intended to constitute legal or other professional advice, and you 
should not rely solely on the services and/or documents in this software, nor any other infor­
mation contained on the site, for making legal decisions. You should consult with an attorney 
for specific advice tailored to your situation. 
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Another way of assuring users of the value of a contract is for the person 
seeking to provide the assurances to expose himself to the prospect of a sub­
stantial loss if the contract turns out to be of low value. In other words, the 
person can post a bond to assure the value of his product. This can be ac­
complished in a few different ways. One way is to establish a reputation that 
will be sacrificed in the event of widespread dissatisfaction with a product. 
So for example, clients of a law firm may believe that the risk of one of the 
firm's contracts being defective is low because the firm has a valuable repu­
tation to protect. Other sorts of bonds can be provided, though. For example, 
one online provider of (free) contracts states: "We're committed to deliver­
ing the highest quality forms on the Internet-so committed, in fact, that 
we' ll pay $50 to any person who can demonstrate that one of our forms is 
not compliant with state law."60 This reward operates as a type of bond, es­
pecially to the extent that it is payable to people other than users who have 
suffered harm. To the extent that for-profits can use these sorts of bonds to 
provide credible assurances of the value of contracts they should not be at a 
disadvantage to nonprofits. 
2. Ability to Attract Other Users 
There may be another significant type of difference between perceptions 
of nonprofits and for-profits that produce boilerplate. It is possible that non­
profit trade associations generally have a higher profile than for-profits. This 
raises the possibility that the contracts produced by nonprofits will be ex­
pected to attract relatively large numbers of users. We have already seen that 
the value of a contractual term is influenced by the rate at which it is ex­
pected to be clarified through litigation and the likelihood that other actors 
in the marketplace will be familiar with it. 61 This in tum implies that the 
value of any given example of boilerplate sometimes depends upon how 
many other people are expected to use it in the near future. Therefore, all 
other things being equal, boilerplate that is expected to attract large numbers 
of users, whether because it stands out amidst a crowd of alternative terms 
or because its drafter is not expected to introduce alternative terms, will tend 
to be more valuable. 
Standard Legal Software, Terms & Conditions, http://standardlegal.net/terms.html (last visited Oct. 
22, 2005). See also, for example, the similar disclaimers issued by U.S. Legal Forms, Inc., Dis­
claimer, License and Liability Limitation, http://www.uslegalforms.com/disclaimer.htm (last visited 
Oct. 22, 2005); LawDepot™.com, Terms and Conditions, http://www.lawdepot.com/terms.php (last 
visited Oct. 22, 2005); and The Consus Group, Terms of Use, http://www.consusgroup.com/ 
about_usnegal_terms_use.asp (last visited Oct. 22, 2005). Clauses of this sort may also be designed 
to avoid liability under statutes that forbid people other than licensed attorneys from practicing law. 
60. Internet Legal Research Group, Legal Forms Archive, http://www.ilrg.com/forms 
(last visited Oct. 22, 2005); see also LawDepot™.com, Automated Service Agreement, http:// 
www.lawdepot.com/contracts/serviceagree/preview.php (last visited Oct. 22, 2005) (offering $ 1 00 to 
the first person to find a mistake in form contract). (Since this latter reward is only offered to the 
first person to find a mistake it is more difficult to characterize as a bond.) 
6 1 .  See supra Section ill.A. I .  
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One might speculate that nonprofits, or at least trade associations, will 
generally have a higher profile than for-profits. If this is the case then users 
will tend to gravitate toward boilerplate produced by nonprofits simply be­
cause they expect other users to do so. However, the claim that nonprofits 
have a higher profile than, for example, prestigious law firms or well estab­
lished providers of legal information is dubious. Moreover, even if 
nonprofits have a relatively high profile, for-profit organizations have an 
offsetting advantage. Specifically, for-profits may be better placed to make 
credible commitments to refrain from introducing alternatives to an existing 
set of contractual terms. Since for-profit firms often "use" contracts as prin­
cipals or as paid drafters, their profits depend upon being intimately familiar 
with the contracts that they use. Consequently, their switching costs may be 
higher than those of a nonprofit that is simply distributing a contract. There­
fore, for-profit firms' commitments to use particular contractual terms may 
be more credible. As a result, it is far from clear whether nonprofits or for­
profits have an advantage in convincing potential users that their terms are 
likely to be popular.62 
C. Production Costs 
Nonprofits may also differ from for-profits in the sense that they face 
different costs of production. One reason this might be the case is because 
nonprofits may have superior access to volunteer labor.63 However, there 
may be factors that offset this advantage. 
1 .  Access to Volunteers 
Having the option of tapping volunteers to assist in drafting contracts 
may be quite advantageous. One reason is that, as discussed in the previous 
subsection, it is difficult to assess how well a contract has been drafted. This 
is true not only for potential users of contracts but also for organizations that 
employ agents to draft contracts. Under these circumstances agents have an 
incentive to shirk their responsibilities. Naturally, external incentive mecha­
nisms such as bonuses, warranties, and bonds (reputational or otherwise) 
can mitigate this problem. To the extent that these fail, however, it will be 
helpful if internal factors such as altruism, professional pride, or the desire 
62. For suggestions that either trade associations or law firms might be able to mitigate co­
ordination problems, see Goetz & Scott, supra note 3, at 293, and Kahan & Klausner, supra note 3,  
at 762-63, which notes, "In this context, standard-setting would mean the development of model 
contract terms, which firms could adopt at their option . . . .  standard-setting institutions can poten­
tially respond to the coordination problem." 
63. The term "volunteers" is used broadly here to refer to any individual or organization that 
provides goods or services on terms that are more favorable than fair market value. Sometimes i t  
may b e  difficult to determine whether an individual o r  the organization with which they are 
affiliated is the true source of a donation. See, e.g. , Nat'l Venture Capital Ass'n, http:// 
www.nvca.org/model_documents/working_group.html (listing individuals who assisted in drafting 
model contracts according to the law firm or venture capital firm with which they are affiliated) (last 
visited Oct. 23, 2005).  
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to exercise and improve skills motivate agents to exert themselves. This will 
frequently be the case for volunteers. 
A second reason why access to volunteers might be important in drafting 
contracts is because it may be useful to have large numbers of people assist, 
at least in small ways, in the drafting process. The principal reason for this 
is that an extraordinarily large number of combinations of contingencies can 
arise in the course of the performance of even a moderately complex con­
tract. It is very difficult for any single person, or even small group of people, 
to foresee all of those contingencies and accurately analyze whether the 
contract will be interpreted to provide appropriate guidance in each sce­
nario. However, a large group of readers may be well suited to undertake 
this analysis collectively, even if each member of the group only devotes a 
relatively small amount of time to the task. The reason is that if the group is 
sufficiently diverse, each member will bring different experiences to the 
table and will identify and focus on different sets of contingencies.64 In addi­
tion, allowing readers to play a role in selecting the problems upon which 
they focus may be a useful way to harness the private information that they 
possess about their own capabilities. Providing monetary compensation to 
members of such a large group might be prohibitively costly, because of 
both the transaction costs of processing payments and the difficulty of as­
signing a price to each contribution. If, however, the members of the group 
provide their services on a voluntary basis then this sort of collective enter­
prise becomes a viable mode of production. In fact it may be superior to 
production by a smaller group whose members provide their services in ex­
change for monetary compensation. This is the logic that has been offered to 
explain the success of open source software projects and other instances of 
what Yochai Benkler calls peer production.65 
Of course, it is quite possible that access to volunteers does not provide 
a significant advantage in the production of boilerplate. In the first place, the 
usefulness of volunteers is likely to depend upon how skilled they are; when 
it comes to drafting contracts, unskilled volunteers may well hinder the 
process more than they help. Furthermore, it may be possible to replicate the 
advantages of relying on volunteers by going out of one's way to hire highly 
motivated employees and, where appropriate, asking large numbers of them 
to contribute at least small amounts of time to each drafting project. A for­
profit organization such as a law firm can easily adopt these practices. 
If we assume that access to volunteers is advantageous it becomes worth­
while to ask: Do nonprofits have better access to volunteers? One would 
expect the answer to depend in part on the reasons why people do and do not 
volunteer. One reason for volunteering is altruism-the desire to benefit oth­
ers. Some altruists may be interested in benefiting the users of a particular 
64. This insight is summed up in Eric Raymond's aphorism, "Given enough eyeballs, all 
bugs are shallow." ERIC STEVEN RAYMOND, THE CATHEDRAL AND THE BAZAAR (Version 3.0, 
2000), http://www.catb.org/-esr/writings/cathedral-bazaar/cathedral-bazaar (follow "Release Early, 
Release Often" hyperlink) (last visited Aug. 2, 2005). 
65. Yochai Benkler, Coase's Penguin, or, Linux and The Nature of the Firm, 1 1 2 YALE L.J. 
369 (2002). 
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class of contracts, for example, "the members of the grain and feed industry," 
or "users of computer software." However, if altruists volunteer on behalf of a 
for-profit organization that supplies contracts to these users, some of the bene­
fits of their efforts are likely to flow to the owners of the organization. Not 
many altruists are likely to be interested in helping this particular class of 
beneficiaries. This suggests that most altruists will be more willing to volun­
teer to draft contracts on behalf of nonprofits than for-profits. 
Whether or not nonprofits have superior access to volunteers also de­
pends on the reasons why people choose not to volunteer for certain 
organizations. Leaving aside altruism, many people volunteer in order to 
socialize or to exercise and hone their professional skills or to obtain status 
in the eyes of their peers. There is no obvious reason why these sorts of 
benefits cannot be obtained by volunteering to draft contracts on behalf of a 
for-profit enterprise. However, for some people the direct personal benefits 
they could receive from volunteering on behalf of a for-profit organization 
might be outweighed by an aversion to gratuitously conferring benefits on 
the owners of a for-profit organization.66 This aversion might lead even peo­
ple who are not exactly altruistic to prefer to volunteer for nonprofits. It is 
unclear, however, how prevalent this attitude is. In fields such as software 
development and the publication of academic journals people frequently 
volunteer to benefit for-profit organizations.
67 For-profit firms also are fre­
quently able to induce their customers to provide volunteer labor in forms 
that range from responses to customer satisfaction surveys to voluntary 
transfers of significant technological innovations.
68 
2. Other Potential Differences in Production Costs 
There are other factors that might systematically influence the relative 
costs of producing contracts in nonprofit as opposed to for-profit organiza­
tions. Some of these might offset the effects of having superior access to 
volunteer labor. 
One factor is that nonprofits might systematically be run more poorly 
than for-profits. The reasoning behind this claim has already been discussed: 
it may be that the absence of residual financial claimants reduces the overall 
level of accountability within nonprofit organizations and thus makes them 
inefficient producers of contracts, or for that matter, anything else. B ut the 
counterarguments listed above are also applicable here. Specifically, 
competitive pressures, efforts to select agents who take pride in their work, 
66. The existence of such an aversion seems particularly plausible when the for-profit or­
ganization is a competitor. So for instance, law firms might donate their services to a trade 
association but not to another private law firm. 
67. Benkler, supra note 65, at 440-41 (discussing whether possibility of others benefiting 
discourages voluntary participation in information production). 
68. For discussion of more extreme examples, see Dietmar Harhoff, Joachim Henkel & Eric 
von Hippe!, Profiting From Voluntary Information Spillovers: How Users Benefit by Freely Reveal­
ing Their Innovations, 32 RES. PoL'Y 1 753 (2003) (discussing when and why users voluntarily 
reveal innovations to suppliers). 
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or accountability to senior managers, members, or donors, might, either 
singly or in combination, be effective substitutes for monitoring on the part 
of residual claimants. 
Another factor to consider is that in certain cases either nonprofits or 
for-profits might have privileged access to resources used to produce or dis­
tribute contracts. For instance, trade associations have privileged access to 
their members. This may give them an advantage both in contacting mem­
bers for feedback and in distributing contracts. Alternatively, for-profit legal 
information services firms might have better access to the technology used 
to distribute contracts electronically. Or a for-profit law firm may have bet­
ter access to experienced drafters. However, it is far from obvious that these 
factors are economically significant since firms in one sector can typically 
obtain access to resources held by firms in another sector through contract.69 
For example, a for-profit organization can purchase access to a trade asso­
ciation's membership list. S imilarly, a nonprofit organization can contract 
with a for-profit software developer to develop technology for distributing 
contracts electronically or with a law firm to draft contracts. 
D. Tax Treatment 
Nonprofits also differ from for-profits that draft boilerplate for use by 
others in terms of their tax treatment. Nonprofits are exempt from certain 
state and local taxes, most notably franchise and property taxes.70 These ex­
emptions clearly give nonprofits a competitive advantage over for-profits by 
lowering their relative costs of production. 
Many types of nonprofits, including trade associations, also derive an 
advantage from being exempt from federal income tax.7 1 Income from ex­
empt nonprofits' unrelated business activities is subject to a federal tax 
called the unrelated business income tax ("UBIT").72 However, for many 
69. An important counterexample to this general claim might be ISO, a for-profit organiza­
tion that produces standard form contracts that are widely used by property and casualty insurers. 
ISO seems to benefit from the fact that it controls valuable actuarial data that is required to price the 
terms of any given policy. See generally ISO, http://www.iso.com (last visited Oct. 23, 2005). 
70. The details vary from state to state. See generally FRANCES R. HILL & BARBARA L. 
KlRSCHTEN, FEDERAL AND STATE TAXATION OF EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS '!l 1 4.04 ( 1 994). 
7 1 .  l.R.C. § 50l (c) (2000) (listing exempt organizations). Section 50l (c)(6) refers to 
"[b ]usiness leagues, chambers of commerce, real-estate boards, boards of trade, or professional 
football leagues (whether or not administering a pension fund for football players), not organized 
for profit and no part of the net earnings of which inures to the benefit of any private shareholder or 
individual." The revenue from the sale of these types of materials to the members of a trade associa­
tion is likely to be subject to the unrelated business income tax. 
72. l.R.C. § 5 1  l (a) (2000). In this context an unrelated business activity is one that is unre­
lated to the purposes that form the basis of the nonprofit's exemption: 
Id. 
The term "unrelated trade or business" means, in the case of any organization subject to the tax 
imposed by section 5 1 1 ,  any trade or business the conduct of which is not substantially related 
(aside from the need of such organization for income or funds or the use it makes of the profits de­
rived) to the exercise or performance by such organization of its charitable, educational, or other 
purpose or function constituting the basis for its exemption under section 501 . . . .  
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nonprofits, selling or licensing contracts seems unlikely to qualify as an un­
related business activity. 
73 Moreover, if the contracts are licensed in 
exchange for royalties, the royalties are excluded from the definition of un­
related business income.74 
Exemption from income tax gives nonprofits an advantage over for­
profits by reducing the nonprofits' cost of raising capital to fund their opera­
tions.75 Consider the following example. Suppose that an organization needs 
to raise $ 10,000 to finance the production of a set of contracts (for use by 
other parties). Assume that the normal after-tax rate of return on an invest­
ment in a venture such as this would be 10% and that the tax rate is 30%. If 
the organization is a for-profit it will have to provide an investor with an 
after-tax return of $ 1 ,000, meaning that it will have to earn roughly 
$1428.57 in before-tax income. Suppose, however, that the organization is a 
tax-exempt nonprofit. In this case it might try to finance the business by 
charging its members dues in return for an implicit promise to provide 
goods or services at below-market prices in the future. In a sense therefore, 
the members can be characterized as "investors." Assume that, like other 
investors, they demand a return of 10% on their investment. Notice that the 
nonprofit will only have to earn $1000 in before-tax income to generate this 
return. This means that the nonprofit will be able to charge a lower price for 
its products than a for-profit while still generating an acceptable return for 
its investors. Alternatively, it can charge the same price for its products and 
generate a relatively high return for its investors, thus encouraging them to 
invest. The narrower is the range of sources of exempt income, the more 
significant will be the tax-based incentive to produce boilerplate that gener-
• 76 ates exempt mcome. 
73.  In the case of a trade association, any revenue derived from the distribution of material to 
its members that assists them in the conduct of their business seems to be clearly related to the pur­
poses of the association. See Treas. Reg. § 1 .5 1 3-1 (definition of unrelated trade or business). See 
Example 6 in particular: 
Id. 
Z is an association exempt under section 501 (c)(6), formed to advance the interests of a par­
ticular profession and drawing its membership from the members of that profession. Z 
publishes a monthly journal containing articles and other editorial material which contribute 
importantly to the accomplishment of purposes for which exemption is granted the organiza­
tion. Income from the sale of subscriptions to members and others in accordance with the 
organization's exempt purposes, therefore, does not constitute gross income from unrelated 
trade or business. 
74. I.R.C. § 5 1 2(a), (b)(2) (2000). 
75. See Henry B. Hansmann, Unfair Competition and the Unrelated Business Income Tax, 
75 VA. L. REV. 605, 609-12  ( 1 989). 
76. The consequences would be similar if nonprofits were not exempt from income taxation 
but typically were able to avoid generating taxable income by offsetting income from business ac­
tivities with expenses incurred in providing benefits to members. However, Internal Revenue Code 
§ 277 l imits the scope for this practice. That provision prevents certain non-tax-exempt organiza­
tions from treating expenditures on member benefits as deductions from income generated from 
business activities. 
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III. WELFARE IMPLICATIONS 
Many of the differences between nonprofits and for-profits that engage 
in the production of boilerplate for use by others should, if anything, serve 
to give nonprofits a competitive advantage. This conjecture is consistent 
with the fact that if we leave aside boilerplate produced by firms for their 
own use, nonprofit trade associations appear to dominate the production of 
many types of boilerplate. It is also worth noting that some of the distinctive 
features of production of boilerplate by nonprofits, and in particular their 
potentially greater sensitivity to externalities, credibility, and access to vol­
unteers, might make it relatively attractive for users to obtain boilerplate 
externally from a nonprofit rather than producing it internally. 
However, even if nonprofits enjoy competitive advantages in the produc­
tion of boilerplate, it does not necessarily mean that it is in society's best 
interests for nonprofits to exploit those advantages. Whether or not it is so­
cially optimal for nonprofits to dominate the production of boilerplate 
depends, among other things, on the reasons why they dominate. (Other 
relevant factors will include the extent to which users can choose between 
competing nonprofit providers of boilerplate or are capable of adapting 
terms provided by nonprofits to suit their own purposes.) 
For instance, if nonprofits dominate for-profits because of differences in 
their objectives, the desirability of this state of affairs depends upon which 
type of organization's objectives is best aligned with society's interests. If 
we assume that the principal difference between the two types of organiza­
tions along this dimension is that nonprofits are more likely to take into 
account externalities, and so are more likely to make socially optimal draft­
ing decisions, then having nonprofits dominate the production of boilerplate 
seems benign. However, as we have already seen, there are reasons to ques­
tion the assumption that nonprofits are more likely to take into account 
externalities.77 Not all nonprofits are even ostensibly interested in advancing 
the interests of a large and representative portion of the users of the contrac­
tual terms that they draft. In the case of some of these nonprofits, deciding 
whether or not their missions are consistent with the interests of society is a 
value-laden exercise-who is to say that software ought to be free? More­
over, even those nonprofits whose mission statements are undisputedly 
benign may have agents who routinely deviate from those missions. Still 
other nonprofits may have objectives indistinguishable from for-profits be­
cause they treat the production of boilerplate as a means of generating 
revenue to support other activities. 
The social welfare analysis seems more straightforward if nonprofits' 
advantage over for-profits rests on superior access to volunteers. If there are 
certain people who prefer, for whatever reason, to volunteer on behalf of 
nonprofits rather than for-profits, then allowing nonprofits to use those vol­
unteers enhances social welfare to the extent that it improves the welfare of 
77. For similar arguments, see Clayton P. Gillette, Harnwny and Stasis in Trade Usages for 
International Sales, 39 VA. J. INT'L L. 707, 737-38 ( 1 999). 
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the volunteers. Society also benefits from a certain amount of additional 
production to the extent that if barred from volunteering for a nonprofit 
some people would choose to engage in less productive activities. 
78 
The welfare analysis is slightly more complicated if nonprofits' advan­
tage over for-profits lies in superior ability to offer credible assurances of 
the value of contracts. Allowing nonprofits to dominate for-profits for this 
reason seems desirable if users of contracts accurately assess nonprofits' 
credibility. In this case, having nonprofits produce boilerplate minimizes the 
costs to society of distributing boilerplate by minimizing the costs to users 
of searching for appropriate boilerplate. It is a different story, however, if 
users regularly err in their assessments of nonprofits' credibility. For exam­
ple, it may be the case that an undeserved aura of credibility surrounds trade 
associations that draft boilerplate, even though they are in fact no more 
credible than other organizations. In this case society would be better off if 
boilerplate were produced by the organizations that were actually, rather 
than merely perceived to be, the most credible. 
Finally, in the absence of offsetting considerations, it seems undesirable 
to allow nonprofits to derive any significant advantage over for-profits from 
their preferential tax treatment. Differential tax treatment of this sort tends 
to allow relatively inefficient nonprofits to offer contracts at lower cost than 
more efficient for-profits. This will cause society to expend more resources 
than necessary in producing contracts of a given quality. 
In light of the above, it is difficult to say as a general matter whether it is 
socially optimal for nonprofits to dominate the production of boilerplate. At 
this point, all we can say is that there are certain conditions under which this 
might be an optimal state of affairs. First, in producing boilerplate nonprof­
its might take into account a larger proportion of the benefits to consumers 
and third parties than would a similarly situated for-profit. Second, nonprof­
its might be accurately perceived to be more credible than for-profits. Third, 
nonprofits might have greater access to skilled volunteer labor. Under any or 
all of these conditions it seems reasonable to presume that having nonprofits 
play a significant role in the production of boilerplate is socially desirable. 
It would, of course, be nice to have direct empirical tests of whether so­
ciety benefits from having nonprofits as opposed to for-profits produce 
boilerplate. But it is important to recognize that testing hypotheses about 
whether the behavior of a particular set of drafters is socially optimal is dif­
ficult. The principal difficulty stems from the need to make judgments about 
whether any given drafting decision is or is not socially optimal.79 For ex­
ample, in their seminal article Goetz and Scott seem to suggest that trade 
associations in the construction industry were too slow to draft novel con­
tracts in response to a change in construction practices in the 1970s. They 
78. See Kevin E. Davis, The Regulation of Social Enterprise, in BETWEEN STATE AND 
MARKET: ESSAYS ON CHARITIES LAW AND POLICY IN CANADA 485, 496 (Jim Phillips et. al. eds., 
200 1 ). 
79. Kahan & Klausner, supra note 3, at 750 ("We have no choice but to rely on our own 
judgment in arguing that a particular formulation of the event risk covenant is suboptimal . . . .  "). 
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report that the leading trade associations, the American Institute of Archi­
tects and the Associated General Contractors, took nearly ten years to 
produce new contracts. Goetz and Scott imply that this delay was sub­
optimal. 80 However, they reject with virtually no explanation the possibility 
that it was optimal for the trade associations to wait and gather more infor­
mation about the new practices before drafting a new contract.8 1 In principle 
though, the costs associated with a faster response, in the form of either be­
ing stuck with a less than optimal contract or having to switch to a revised 
version, might well have outweighed the benefits of introducing a new con­
tract. 
IV. LEGAL IMPLICATIONS 
Understanding the relationship between the conditions under which boi­
lerplate is produced and social welfare can have the practical benefit of 
informing the design of legal norms. In particular, understanding the manner 
in which contracts are produced can help to inform decisions about whether 
and how the state should become involved in the formulation of contractual 
terms. 
A. Should the State Intervene in the Production of Contracts ? 
One of the main implications of the discussion to this point is that in de­
ciding whether state intervention in the production of contracts is required it 
is important to consider the abilities of both for-profit and nonprofit organi­
zations. There is room for disagreement about how well the state-or any 
given branch of it-is likely to fare if it attempts to intervene in the produc­
tion of contracts. However, it seems reasonable to presume that the lower is 
the quality of the contracts that non-state actors are capable of producing, 
the stronger is the case for state intervention. 
Most of the academic literature on this topic has focused on for-profit 
actors and the extent to which factors such as externalities and asymmetric 
information limit their ability to produce contracts. This narrow focus is 
potentially misleading. For example, it may be reasonable to conclude that 
the quality of contracts generated by for-profit actors will be relatively low 
in industries where none of the users of the contract, or their agents, has a 
large share of the market. However, it would not be reasonable to conclude 
that the quality of contracts in these types of industries will typically be low. 
This is because in many industries where atomistic contracting prevails 
there is at least one trade association that invests in drafting standard form 
contracts. There may also be other nonprofits, such as a local bar associa­
tion, that do the same. For any or all of the reasons set out in Part III these 
80. Goetz & Scott, supra note 3, at 304. 
8 1 .  Id. at 297-98 (arguing the construction industry deliberately chose "to keep the concepts 
loosely defined to permit a flexible response to the perplexing changes in the economic climate") 
(quoting Walter F. Pratt, Jr., Afterword: Contracts and Uncertainty, 46 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 
1 69, 1 70-7 1 ( 1 983)). 
M arch 2006 1 The Role of Nonprofits I I O I  
nonprofits might make very different drafting decisions from for-profit or­
ganizations. 
For example, in some regions a paradigmatic example of an industry 
characterized by atomistic contracting is the real estate brokerage indus­
try-particularly in regions where lawyers play a limited role in real estate 
closings. In many areas state or local realtors' associations draft standard 
form contracts.82 All of the factors identified in Part III might, at least poten­
tially, induce these associations to invest in producing high quality contracts. 
First, in relation to most terms of contracts such as agreements of purchase 
and sale, the association's interests should be well-aligned with those of the 
entire body of users, especially when its members are just as likely to be 
involved on one side of the transaction as the other. (Listing agreements, in 
which brokers' interests are consistently opposed to those of property own­
ers are, therefore, potentially problematic.) Second, the realtor's association 
is well placed to assure users that due care has been taken to update the con­
tracts to reflect changes in the law because ultimately the people engaged to 
draft the contract are accountable to an important subset of users. Third, the 
association can tap volunteers from its membership to participate in review­
ing existing contracts and proposed revisions.83 Fourth, these associations 
typically benefit from preferential tax treatment. As a result, if they engage 
in tax-exempt activities such as the production of standard form contracts 
they should be able to offer members a relatively high return on the mem­
bership dues "invested" in the assuciation. 
The more general point here is that without knowing anything about the 
nonprofits active in an industry it is dangerous to speculate about the quality 
of the contracts available to participants in that industry. This idea clearly 
has implications for how contract law ought to vary across industries. It also 
has implications for how contract law ought to vary across societies, as it 
suggests that the nature and quality of a society's associational life will be 
an important determinant of the quality of the contracts formed by the 
members of that society. 
B. How Should the State Intervene in 
the Production of Contracts ? 
Suppose we assume that it is necessary for the state to intervene in the 
drafting of a particular class of contracts. In this case the idea that nonprofits 
can play an important role in drafting contracts has implications for the 
82. See, for example, the range of jurisdictions that produce contracts for use with Zipforms, 
the software package produced by a joint venture of the National Association of Realtors and 
the California Association of Realtors. See ZipForm Desktop, Purchase ZipForm, http:// 
www.zipform.com/order/order.asp (last visited Nov. 3, 2005). 
83. In an interview with the author, the general counsel of the California Association of 
Realtors described a lengthy review and consultation process surrounding new contracts. The prin­
cipal participants in the process were volunteers, aided by two staff lawyers. Interview with June 
B arlow, Vice President and General Counsel, California Ass'n of Realtors (July 1 8, 2005) (on file 
with author). 
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manner in which the state should intervene. Specifically, it implies that in 
addition to or instead of attempting to draft contracts itself, the state might 
attempt to encourage nonprofits to emerge and participate in the process.84 
The encouragement offered could take many forms, ranging from legal doc­
trines that presume the validity of terms formulated by nonprofits,85 to 
privileged access to government officials, to preferential tax treatment. 
Consider, for example, a jurisdiction in which the quality of residential 
agreements of purchase and sale is perceived to be poor, perhaps on ac­
count of the atomistic structure of the real estate brokerage industry and 
the absence of any related trade association. A government agency could 
respond to this situation by drafting a set of terms to be implied by law 
into every agreement of purchase and sale. Alternatively though, the 
agency might attempt to encourage a group of real estate brokers, or per­
haps a group of legal professionals, to form an association with a mandate 
to draft and maintain a model contract. The arguments set out in Parts III 
and IV suggest reasons why, if structured appropriately, such an associa­
tion might do a better job than a set of for-profit actors drafting contracts 
independent! y. 
A similar observation applies where a nonprofit is involved in drafting 
contracts but is doing a poor job. There are a number of circumstances in 
which this might be true :  the nonprofit's membership may not be represen­
tative of the users of the contract, it may be using the income from the sale 
of contracts purely to fund its other activities and thus have no particular 
incentive to make unobservable investments in quality, it may make little 
use of volunteer labor, or it may not be tax-exempt. Under these conditions 
there may be grounds for state intervention. But that intervention need not 
involve direct production of contractual terms by the state. It could also 
involve encouraging other nonprofits to become involved. For example, a 
court might threaten to undertake heightened scrutiny of any standard 
form contract drafted by the association unless endorsements have been 
obtained from associations representing all potential users.86 
CONCLUSION 
The irony here is that some of the most iconic products of a market­
oriented society, contracts, often seem to be produced in a realm that is 
ordinarily presumed to be at least one step removed from a free market. 
Moreover, this may not be a bad thing, even according to conventional 
economic criteria. This has potentially significant implications for our un­
derstandings of the determinants of the quality of contractual terms, 
84. For similar suggestions, see Greely, supra note 3, at 1 69 (suggesting that standard-setting 
organizations be promoted):  Ronald J. Mann, "Contracting " for Credit, 1 04 MICH. L. REV. 899, 
930 (2006) (recommending that standardized credit card agreements be drafted by intermediaries 
such as Visa or Mastercard). 
85. For a recommendation along these lines, see Choi & Gulati, supra note 24, at 1 1 70. 
86. For a recommendation that a similar strategy be adopted in Europe, see Hugh Collins, 
The Freedom to Circulate Documents: Regulating Contracts in Europe, IO EuR. L.J. 787 (2004). 
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whether and how the state should intervene in the formulation of those 
terms, and, more generally, the role of trade associations and other non­
profits in a market economy. These topics all warrant further investigation. 
1 1 04 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 1 04: 1 075 
